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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
UN sanctions committees and panels of  experts face a variety of  challenges in meeting their responsibilities under 
the different UN sanctions regimes. Considering the importance of  sanctions to the efforts of  the UN to address 
problems that threaten international peace and security, finding solutions to these challenges is both warranted and 
urgently necessary to ensure the effective use of  sanctions in international policy. 
To develop a clearer sense of  the specific nature of  these problems, the authors undertook an informal survey of  
committee members and experts in late 2015 and early 2016 to identify specific issues facing sanctions committees, 
panel members, and member states. This survey revealed a number of  specific challenges, but at the core, they 
revolve around three themes: absence of  proper training; shortage of  proper analytic support, including access to 
technical capabilities and laboratory equipment; and inadequate education for sanctions committee members, panel 
experts, and member states.
A number of  these problems could be mitigated by targeted assistance programs. The authors identified six specific 
proposals that could address these problems. In sum, these are:
1. provision of  regular, specific training courses on sanctions topics;
2. provision of  facilities and opportunities for dedicated, off-site informal discussions among sanctions committee 
chairs to promote information sharing on best practices, problems, and solutions;
3. establishment of  a regular mechanism for the provision of  ad hoc funding of  specific requirements for sanctions 
implementation, similar to member state support programs for other specialized agencies such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
4. establishment of  “matchmaking” facilities between potential donors and recipients for specific, identified 
projects;
5. development of  a guidebook for member states on implementation of  UNSC sanctions resolutions and, in time, 
dedicated training resources; and
6. analytical papers on specific aspects of  UNSC sanctions, intended to explore best practices, problems to avoid, 
and solutions to frequent implementation issues.
By funding and implementing such programs, individual UN member states or other donors could provide significant 
practical support to sanctions committees and experts, and thus enhance the effectiveness of  UN Security Council 
sanctions regimes. 
The international policy value in doing so is potentially immense, given the application of  sanctions in a variety 
of  hotspots around the world—such as with North Korea and ISIS—and reluctance among major powers for 
substantial political and military interventions to address these hotspots. Given the importance attached to sanctions 
as part of  the UNSC policy-making process, this is an urgent requirement that ought to be prioritized as the Security 
Council considers the next steps in its critical work.
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INTRODUCTION
UN Security Council (UNSC) mandated sanctions have been in existence since 1966, when the UN Security 
Council imposed mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. Since that time, UNSC sanctions have been the hallmark 
of  international censure of  states, entities, or individuals that act outside of  the norms of  acceptable international 
conduct or law. In 2015, there were 16 UNSC sanctions regimes, the highest number of  active sanctions regimes to 
date. Three of  these regimes have since been terminated by the Security Council, and as of  this writing, there are 13 
regimes, described in the annex.
Legally, UNSC sanctions are authorized by Chapter VII, Article 41 of  the UN Charter, which states in full:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of  armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of  the United Nations to apply such measures. These 
may include complete or partial interruption of  economic relations and of  rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, 
and other means of  communication, and the severance of  diplomatic relations.1 
As a result, UNSC sanctions provide the Security Council with enforcement options that do not involve the use of  
armed force, which has complications both practical and political. They can be and have been imposed to try to 
prevent conflict; human rights abuses; terrorism; proliferation of  weapons, including WMD; or other regional or 
global threats. Although by themselves sanctions may be insufficient to induce compliance with UNSC resolutions, 
there is no doubt that they will continue to be the Security Council’s primary tool for policy enforcement for the 
foreseeable future.
Yet implementation problems abound throughout the UNSC sanctions system. Multiple reports by the various 
panels of  experts (POE) who are associated with the various sanctions regimes have described the failure of  UN 
member states to fulfill their obligations (examples are listed below). These can range from the somewhat pedantic 
requirement to provide implementation reports on the measures imposed by the UNSC to the far more serious 
requirement to abide by the specific terms of  the resolutions. Moreover, many of  these failures are not just by the 
state targeted by the sanctions—which, though required to abide by UNSC decisions pursuant to the UN Charter, 
often reject UNSC decisions out of  hand—but also by states around the world. Many of  these failures may be 
attributed to ignorance or capacity problems. In other cases, an affirmative decision on the part of  the disobedient 
states to disregard their obligations may be to blame.
This paper outlines some of  the results of  informal conversations held with sanctions committee members and POE 
members in late 2015 and early 2016 about the deficiencies of  UN sanctions implementation. The paper attempts no 
analysis of  the public policy significance of  these deficiencies but takes as its starting point the need to remedy the 
situation given the established and well-documented use of  sanctions by the UNSC to manage international crises, 
particularly since the end of  the Cold War. It identifies potential solutions to the problems identified, most of  which 
are embodied in a need for targeted assistance programs to committee members, experts, and member states. By 
funding and implementing such programs, individual UN member states or other donors could provide significant 
practical support to sanctions committees and experts and thus enhance the effectiveness of  UN Security Council 
sanctions regimes as well as fulfill the central mission of  UNSC sanctions: the avoidance of  military force where 
possible in addressing some of  the most pressing international security challenges that exist today. 
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BACKGROUND ON THE UNSC SANCTIONS SYSTEM
Before offering recommendations for improving implementation of  the UNSC sanctions system, it is vital to identify 
its common elements both from an organization perspective and from an implementation perspective.
Organizational Dynamics
A common misconception about the UN system is that the UN is responsible for independent action or is a stakeholder 
in its own right. Certainly, the UN Charter describes the secretary general as “chief  administrative officer” of  the 
organization. But it also specifies that he shall perform “such other functions as are entrusted” to him by the Security 
Council and UN General Assembly and other UN organs. So he is responsible to UN member states, and authorities he 
has are delegated by member states. For readers familiar with the corporate world more than the UN, one could think of  
the secretary general as essentially the equivalent of  the CEO of  a large company, possessing autonomy to take certain 
decisions in line with the authorities granted to her by her board of  directors, but—under most corporate structures—
the board itself  retains the ultimate authority over the future direction of  the company and can even dismiss a CEO 
that has failed to operate as required. 
For much the same reason, the UN secretariat has some limited independence and autonomy, but its freedom of  action 
is very much circumscribed by the UN Charter and the decisions of  member states. Moreover, the secretariat is itself  
relatively small, with its primary functions largely organizational and serving as a resource for the UN membership, 
particularly as a source of  continuity of  knowledge for an ever-changing UNSC rotation. In fact, much of  the work 
done at the United Nations is not done by the secretariat at all, or, certainly, not by the secretariat alone. Often, it is 
the career diplomats and bureaucrats attached to the various New York–based missions of  UN member states who are 
responsible for much of  the action at the UNSC and in its constituent elements.
When we discuss the UNSC sanctions system, therefore, it is important to understand who is actually responsible for 
what and how the pieces interact. There are three primary organizations of  interest:
1. UN sanctions committees: These are committees composed of  representatives of  the entirety of  the UNSC at the 
moment. They therefore always have a representative of  the permanent 5 (P-5) members of  the UNSC: China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They also have representatives of  the elected 10 (E-
10) members of  the UNSC, which—as for 2017—includes Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, and Uruguay. Sanctions committees are tasked with working through questions of  UNSC 
resolutions imposing sanctions, particularly as related to implementation problems or violations. Their participants 
should be seen as essentially the delegates of  their ambassadors, charged with working through the details of  
sanctions. The committees are chaired by a representative of  the E-10, with committee assignments the subject of  
some political maneuvering in the weeks prior to the E-10 members joining the council. The terms of  reference of  
each committee are set out in its corresponding Security Council resolution. Each committee has a web page on the 
UN website with information about the resolutions, the committee’s mandate, and guidance on implementation by 
member states.
2. UN panels of  experts (POEs): In theory and often in practice, POEs are assemblies of  experts in particular fields 
implicated in the imposition of  UNSC sanctions whose responsibility is to investigate violations and implementation 
problems and provide regular reports to the UNSC on their findings. They are not technically subordinate to 
sanctions committees but rather to the full UNSC (though, as noted above, this is a somewhat abstract distinction, 
given the nature of  committee representation). POE members are UN contractors serving defined terms. Often, the 
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nationalities of  POE membership are worked out in private negotiations prior to the imposition of  UN sanctions, 
though there are occasionally areas of  flexibility for appointment. Often, but not always, the full P-5 is represented 
in the POE. POE members are expected to have a primary allegiance to the UN itself.
3. UN secretariat: As noted, the UN secretariat (specifically, the UN Security Council Affairs Division, or SCAD) 
serves an instrumental role as a source of  knowledge about how sanctions operate in practical terms, offering 
guidance to UNSC members looking to impose sanctions but unclear as to the best way to do so. At present, SCAD 
organizes induction courses for incoming sanctions committee chairs and members that provide an introduction 
to UN sanctions, and explains UNSC procedures and mechanics of  administrative support. In recent years SCAD 
has also taken measures to improve enterprise-wide implementation of  UNSC sanctions*, including deepening the 
professional sanctions expertise of  its staff. The UN secretariat can also take on additional tasks on occasion, as with 
the case with the residual Iran-related sanctions regime in place after the conclusion of  the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of  Action (JCPOA). But the secretariat’s role is intended to be organizational and advisory, not decision making. 
Combined, these three organizations form the framework for execution of  the UN’s role in UNSC sanctions. They 
operate mostly in and around the UN in New York, with no presence naturally within the bureaucracies of  the 193 
member states of  the UN. These organizations provide guidance and information to UN member states, but, importantly, 
it is member states themselves that are responsible for the implementation of  the decisions made by the UNSC. 
Sanctions and Sanctions Implementation 
The majority of  UNSC sanctions resolutions require UN member states to implement a mix of  arms embargoes, travel 
bans, and asset freezes. Some sanctions regimes (particularly those related to proliferation) also include additional 
requirements. For example, in some sanctions resolutions, measures have been adopted that require enhanced export 
controls (to deal with the risk of  proliferation); cargo inspections; prohibitions or regulations on financial or related 
services; and even more obscure areas, such as the export of  luxury goods to DPRK or charcoal from Somalia. 
Ideally, member states should implement all provisions to a uniformly high standard, but in practice this does not 
happen. For example:
  
• multiple reports of  interdictions suggest that UNSC sanctions relating to dual-use goods are not always incorporated 
into export control processes, or controls are not always enforced2;
• travel bans are not always enforced—for example, in the case of  international travel by the Islamic Revolution 
Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani3; 
• violations of  arms embargoes are widely documented†;
• asset freezes are not always enforced‡; and
*Measures include the introduction of  a common format to committee web pages and compiling a consolidated list of  
designations under all UNSC sanctions resolutions.
†For example, the final reports of  the UN Panel on Libya (S/2016/209), on Yemen (S/2016/73), and on DPRK (S/2014/147).
‡For example, final report of  UN Panel on Libya (S/2016/209).
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• implementation reports are often not submitted by member states (for example, although required within 60 days 
of  approval of  each UNSC resolution on Iran, fewer than 50 percent of  member states had submitted reports by 
the time sanctions were terminated in January 2016).
The uneven implementation by member states can significantly undermine the impact and effectiveness of  UN sanctions, 
and many studies have been carried out to try to identify solutions to the problem.§ The most recent of  these was a 
review conducted in 2014 by the governments of  Australia, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Sweden4. The review was 
underpinned by a Security Council debate on UNSC sanctions on 25 November 2014.5
The review included 150 recommendations for action, focused primarily on four main groups of  actors: the Security 
Council (approx. 32 percent of  the recommendations); sanctions committees and experts supporting these committees 
(21 percent); the UN secretariat (37 percent); and others such as member states, civil society, and the private sector (17 
percent). They are summarized in a compendium published in November 2015.6 
Although work on a number of  these recommendations has been taken forward, by committees and the UN secretariat, 
as a whole the review and the Security Council debate make clear that many member states have an imperfect 
understanding of  requirements of  Security Council sanctions and implementation good practices. Many member states 
may also lack capacity or resources to implement sanctions effectively. Some may also lack political will.
§See, for example, the Interlaken Process (1998–1999), the Stockholm Process (2001–2003), and the symposium on Enhancing 
the Implementation of  UN Security Council Sanctions (2007).
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INFORMAL SURVEY
The authors have many years’ experience of  UN and other sanctions regimes and are familiar with challenges of  
implementation from a perspective similar to the high-level review. Brewer was familiar with issues faced by committees 
and by panels (both those based in New York and overseas) after spending five years as an expert on the UN Panel 
on Iran in New York. For the purposes of  this paper, however, we believed that it would be useful to collect further 
information in order to gain a more balanced understanding of  some of  the specific challenges currently faced by a 
range of  different sanctions committees and expert panels. To accomplish this, Brewer carried out an informal survey 
of  a selection of  committee members and experts, both New York based and home based (the latter during visits to 
New York), between late 2015 and early 2016. This survey was nonscientific but organized to maximize coverage over 
issue areas, committee jurisdiction, and individual levels of  responsibility and to avoid “groupthink.” In conducting 
this survey, Brewer engaged with 6 different committee members (most of  whom cover a variety of  committees and 
issue areas), 3 members of  the UN secretariat, and 6 different panel members. Respondents were asked individually 
to identify the practical difficulties they experienced in performing their duties and how these might be addressed. 
Their responses are summarized below, not in any order of  priority, for the sake of  clarity and to ensure consistency 
with the recommendations for support described in the next section. Importantly, the comments and concerns 
described below apply variously, although in some cases with different weights, to members of  sanctions committees, 
POEs, and member states more generally. 
Comments from committee members included the following:
• Committee members may have had little or no training on sanctions issues before starting work in New York in their 
committees; some may have been forced to learn “on the job,” and if  there is no one with experience to talk to 
in their missions, they may have needed to seek guidance from a member state friend or ally. 
• Committee members need a better understanding of  the principles of  UN sanctions (norms and standards) and the 
vocabulary used in sanctions resolutions.
• Committee members need to be better informed on the history and background of  their sanctions regime; why the 
regime is in place; what it is designed to achieve; and the reasons behind the specific elements of  the provisions—
for example, designations of  individuals and entities for the purposes of  asset freezes.
• Member states need guidance on implementation of  specific measures—for example, asset freezes, travel controls, 
implementation of  arms embargoes.
• Member states need guidance on incorporation of  UN resolutions into national legislation.
• Committee members need mechanisms for comparing notes or sharing experiences between committees where this 
would add value.
• Committee members need better understanding of  the role of  the ombudsperson and of  due process regarding 
designations (e.g., mechanisms for challenges and delisting).
• There is a need for better mechanisms for working with relevant specialist bodies actors such as Interpol, 
Financial Action Task Force, and the International Criminal Court in support of  the work of  committees.
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Comments from POE members (some based in New York, some home based) included: 
• Experts have a range of  training needs, depending on their background and expertise, including in areas such as:
o open-source data-mining techniques, use of  data exploitation tools, techniques for searching the deep 
web, techniques for searches in foreign languages;
o standards and techniques for maintenance of  continuity of  evidence in cases under investigation;
o the shipping business: understanding the range of  documentation and use of  registers and other 
databases;
o financial forensic techniques and financial databases;
o identification of  conventional weapons;
o commodity trading practices;
o export controls (legislation and implementation); and
o sanctions legislation and implementation.
• Experts need stronger, more consistent support to investigations and analyses of  interdicted shipments—for 
example, analytical equipment or laboratory facilities.** 
• Experts require a source of  funding for ad hoc projects in support of  mandates of  individual panels.
• Experts could use stronger support to outreach efforts for capacity-building for member states’ institutions, (e.g., 
to banks and central banks in support of  implementation of  financial sanctions).
• Experts require training in personal physical security, especially practical training in support of  the UN’s desk-
based training. The March 2017 killing of  two UN experts—Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan—and their 
Congolese interpreter, Betu Tshintela, underscores this necessity.7 
**The authors note that this need was even more strongly observed by POE members serving on the Iran and DPRK panels, 
given the focus of  their responsibilities in dealing with nuclear nonproliferation issues in those countries. However, one could 
anticipate a similar need in dealing with other such problems—such as dealing with Syria’s chemical weapons—if  international 
consensus existed to treat this problem and future ones at the UNSC.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Based upon the results of  the survey and our own experience, we identified six specific proposals that, if  implemented, 
would improve the standards of  implementation for UNSC sanctions across the board. They reflect the variety of  
challenges faced by different sanctions committees and their expert panels. However, some of  them can potentially 
be addressed with common solutions.
In sum, these are:
• provision of  regular, specific training courses on sanctions topics;
• provision of  facilities and opportunities for dedicated, off-site informal discussions among sanctions committee 
chairs to promote information sharing on best practices, problems, ad solutions;
• establishment of  a regular mechanism for the provision of  ad hoc funding of  specific requirements for sanctions 
implementation, similar to member state support programs for other specialized agencies such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
• establishment of  “matchmaking” facilities between potential donors and recipients for specific, identified 
projects;
• development of  a guidebook for member states on implementation of  UNSC sanctions resolutions and, in time, 
dedicated training resources; and
• analytical papers on specific aspects of  UNSC sanctions, intended to explore best practices, problems to avoid, 
and solutions to frequent implementation issues.
The authors recognize that some of  these proposals, at least in part, appear similar to existing programs in 
relationship to resolution 1540 (2004). For example, the 1540 committee facilitates donor matchmaking. However, 
the requirements of  resolution 1540 (2004) are different from the range of  requirements of  the thirteen current 
UN sanctions resolutions. UNSCR 1540 is about capacity building, but for member states rather than the UN or 
its constituent organs (so its efforts would not address a substantial gap identified in this paper). Moreover, there is 
political sensitivity around this capacity building, as some states believe that UNSCR 1540 was intended all along as 
a Trojan horse for sanctions enforcement rather than positive, nonproliferation capacity building for member states. 
Adapting 1540’s efforts for sanctions enforcement would therefore be ruled out by political considerations. That said, 
the authors recognize that there is complementarity in some of  the proposals we suggest and, at a minimum, the 
recommendations made here would not undermine the work of  other UNSC bodies. 
We will now explore each of  these proposals at length. 
Proposal 1 Provision of  Regular, Specific Training Courses on Sanctions Topics
Training courses would be focused on requirements of  members of  sanctions committees, experts, and UN secretariat 
officials, but they could be extended to include other member state officials. A draft syllabus is set out below that 
reflects points made by members of  sanctions committees and expert panels. 
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Ideally courses would be organized by a non-UN body and held off  site, possibly every six months depending on 
demand. They would not be a substitute for SCAD’s induction courses for incoming committee chairs, but they could 
provide the basis for a standardized induction process, as recommended by the high-level review (see compendium, 
p. 39). Such courses could also address a variety of  other compendium recommendations, including:
• training on standards for expert groups (Compendium Recommendation 14);
• sensitization of  expert groups on role of  human rights and humanitarian actors (Recommendation 60);
• outreach and dialogue with the private sector (Recommendation 72); 
• employment of  standards, guidance, and best practices developed by the FATF (Recommendation 85); 
• utilization of  INTERPOL’s guidelines by expert groups (Recommendation 86); and 
• strengthening relationships between expert groups and regional and subregional organizations (Recommendation 105).
Possible curriculum
Morning Afternoon Possible Trainers











Day 2 Incorporation of UNSC sanctions 
into national legislation; their 
implementation and enforcement




Day 3 Briefings from intergovernment 
organizations (e.g., FATF, Interpol)
Briefings from industry associations 
(e.g., FIATA, banking associations)
Briefings from regional organizations 
(e.g., GCC, CARICOM)
Representatives of these bodies
Day 4 Issues specific to individual 






UNSC committee members 
SCAD staff
Others
IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS
energypolicy.columbia.edu | JUNE 2017 |  13
Proposal 2 Provision of  Facilities for Off-Site Informal Discussions 
The provision of  such facilities would provide opportunities for committee chairs and members to meet off  site 
to compare notes and discuss common issues, informally and off  the record. Despite the need identified above for 
mechanisms for comparing notes or sharing experiences between committees, there is no current mechanism for 
doing this on a collective basis. Such meetings might take place annually, depending on demand. But the objective 
would be to provide an apolitical space (or as close as may be conceivable in as political an organization as the UN) 
for consultations on the way in which sanctions are being implemented and common sense solutions for identified 
problems. Importantly, this sort of  forum would ensure that chairs are able to share information with one another 
rather than relying on staff  to be the conduits. This could help address issues of  stove-piping for some missions and 
information overload for others.
Proposal 3 Ad Hoc Funding of  Specific Requirements
One of  the areas of  constant concern for those surveyed is that POEs in particular lack access to the sorts of  tools 
necessary to perform their functions. Politically, seeking an increase in the UN budget is difficult to arrange and to 
secure. Moreover, any increase in the UN budget would require competition for those scarce additional resources, 
with POEs contending against a range of  other, perhaps vital resource demands.
One solution to this problem could be to develop a mechanism for the provision of  specific, dedicated assistance to 
the sanctions mission of  the UNSC. Precedents for such funding exist in the case of  the IAEA, where a mechanism 
has been set up for member states to donate in-kind assistance across the range of  IAEA programs. In the area of  
safeguards, for example, a number of  member states have safeguards support programs. There is no template for 
provision of  such support: agreement is reached between the IAEA and the state on the assistance itself  and on 
how the contribution is transferred and reflected in the IAEA budget. An alternative model is the UN Trust Fund 
for Global and Regional Disarmament Affairs, managed by UNODA, providing support to implementation of  
resolution 1540 (2004).
Examples of  possible ad-hoc funding might include support to specific panels to cover budget shortfalls for defined 
requirements—for example, access to specialized databases, or provision of  relevant equipment or technology, or 
support to regional capacity-building events.
Proposal 4 Provision of  “Matchmaking” Facilities Between Potential Donors and Recipients
Related to proposal 3, one of  the problems that has emerged for POEs is that, absent a dedicated fund, they 
sometimes require support from outside the UN system but have no clear means of  identifying how or whom to get 
this support or from. Often, POE members have found it necessary to rely on their home governments, reducing 
the sense of  independence of  the POE and of  its conclusions. This is counterproductive to the mission of  the POE 
and unnecessary. 
Instead, the POE should be assisted through the creation of  an expert body or point of  contact to coordinate 
assistance requests with potential sources of  support—for example, in areas of  specialized technical assistance or 
provision of  expert advice on drafting legislation. Such a mechanism could help bridge this gap between need and 
capability without relying on home government support.
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Of  course, when consulting with outside expertise, conflicts of  interest can occasionally arise. In most instances, 
however, this is unlikely to be a particular concern on specific sanctions enforcement support tasks or can be managed 
through UN POE discretion. For example, if  the POE requires support for the analysis of  a material sample but has 
no physical laboratory capacity to conduct the analysis, the “matchmaking” facility could identify a list of  laboratories 
around the world for analysis and consultation (similar to how the IAEA seeks material analysis from its network 
of  analytical laboratories, or NWAL). Coding procedures could be used to obscure the collection point for the 
material from the consulted laboratory. Or technical support could take on an even more mundane nature, such as 
the provision of  database access that has utility across UNSC committee and POE jurisdictions. The key issue is to 
avoid the even greater conflict of  interest implied in POE member reliance on home government resources (which 
can come with its own taint, depending on the issue or sanctions target involved), while still ensuring that POEs get 
the technical and other forms of  support necessary to fulfill their functions.
 
Proposal 5 Guidebook for Member States on Implementation of  UNSC Sanctions Resolutions
Although guidance on specific aspects of  implementation of  UN sanctions exists within the SCAD framework, there 
is a need for a comprehensive guidebook to cover—for the range of  sanctions—legislation, structures, procedures 
that states need to have in place to implement requirements, and implementation best practices.
This is a potentially onerous task requiring synthesis of  implementation information that remains inconsistently 
provided to the UNSC, notwithstanding its requirements, and an understanding of  the vagaries of  the national legal 
systems that are key to implementation of  UNSC sanctions. However, ad hoc, varied approaches to implementation 
are inimical to the well-ordered functioning of  the UNSC sanction system. It creates the risk of  sanctions gaps—
as the 2017 DPRK POE report underscores—and of  unfair sanctions implementation practices. No amount of  
standardization for UNSC resolutions or the underlying legislation will completely address this problem, and of  
course UNSC sanctions are not supposed to be based on a “one size fits all” model. However, it can be ameliorated 
through the development of  guidelines and advice, the lack of  which—for most states—may be all that stands in the 
way of  implementation of  sanctions. 
In time, this guidebook could also be made more useful through dedicated training resources, though the authors 
note that this is likely a bridge too far at the present financial and political juncture at the UNSC.
Proposal 6 Analytical Papers on Specific Aspects of  UNSC Sanctions
SCAD has produced a series of  reports (the Sanctions Tools series) compiling information held within the UN 
on sanctions policy and implementation. Depending on coverage and public availability of  these reports, there is a 
requirement for an analytical study of  UN sanctions that focuses on elements common to different resolutions (e.g., 
arms embargoes, asset freezes, travel bans); their implementation; and an analysis of  trends in sanctions policy and 
requirements. More importantly, in addition to the information conveyed in the guidebook identified in proposal 5, 
this analysis could help member states understand better the nature of  the sanctions implementation problems that 
they face and identify ways to solve those problems before they undermine sanctions enforcement writ large and the 
credibility of  the UNSC sanctions system.
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CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
This paper has briefly analyzed the challenges faced by sanctions committees and panels of  experts regarding their 
roles in promoting effective implementation of  UN sanctions, as well as the issues identified by committee members 
and POE members with respect to member state implementation of  sanctions. Proposals have been identified that 
would mitigate some of  the challenges and, at a minimum, establish a better way of  identifying those challenges in 
a formal, systemic way. 
They would improve the effectiveness with which UN bodies in New York execute UNSC sanctions and provide 
support to implementation by member states. Better implementation of  UNSC sanctions by member states would 
ensure greater impact and greater probability of  achieving their objectives, particularly peaceful outcomes to threats 
to international peace and security.
The up-front investment in the process these proposals represent would provide significant efficiencies in terms of  
better-educated and more professional committee members and experts, whether from developed or undeveloped 
countries. Committee members and experts would be better able to tackle their responsibilities from the beginning 
and, with knowledge from the start of  how to deploy necessary tools and capabilities, to meet the challenges of  their 
mandates. 
A perception of  an improved sanctions process, and greater professionalism of  UN bodies in New York, will be of  
inherent benefit to the UN system that occasionally is seen by some as the developed world’s way of  targeting the 
developing world. Moreover, even within the developed world, greater confidence in UN sanctions officials would 
enhance the standing of  the UN sanctions process, contributing to a sense that the UN can handle this responsibility 
and excel, rather than be stymied by bureaucracy, political issues, and financial constraints. Rather than contributing 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy of  futility on the part of  the UN, efficiency, effectiveness, and skill would lead to greater 
international respect for the UN in this regard and, in time, greater confidence in it being up to these challenges.
The authors recognize that while many member states would welcome implementation of  these proposals as a 
way to improve both the effectiveness of  UNSC sanctions and their own contributions to this process, others may 
possibly regard them as intrusions into areas of  UN competence. The authors intend these proposals to be entirely 
complementary to the UN’s existing efforts and to be taken up to the degree that they are useful to individual member 
states. In fact, the authors put forward these concepts out of  an interest in general improvement in sanctions practices 
and operations, rather than out of  a desire to see any particular sanctions regime augmented. Our recommendations 
are made out of  an interest to see an organization to which has been attached considerable responsibility succeed 
regardless of  the issue area or country of  focus. 
Not only are sanctions here to stay but their use is likely to increase, so long as the UN system exists and states look 
for ways of  addressing problems without relying on the use of  military force or the political pressure of  diplomacy. 
The UN membership—and UNSC members in particular—should ensure that they’ve invested properly in their 
success. The proposals outlined in this paper are a start, building on the HLR conducted on the system writ large. We 
hope that member states consider them carefully.
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ANNEX
Current UN Security Council Sanctions Regimes: Summary of  Requirements
Residual UNSC Sanctions Related to Iran after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action








Central African Republic 2127 (2013) Yes Yes Yes
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1718 (2006) Yes Yes Yes Nonproliferation; luxury goods; 
financial measures; bunkering 
services; flight denials; specialized 
teaching and training; etc.
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1533 (2004) Yes Yes Yes
Guinea-Bissau 2048 (2012) No No Yes No panel of experts
Hariri investigation 1656 (2005) No Yes Yes No panel of experts
Iraq 1518 (2003) Yes Yes No No panel of experts
ISIL and Al-Qaeda 1267 (1999) 1989 
(2011) 2253 (2015)
Yes Yes Yes
Libya 1970 (2011) Yes Yes Yes Measures in relation to attempts 
to illicitly export crude oil. Other 
business restrictions also apply.
Somalia and Eritrea 751 (1992) 1907 
(2009)
Yes Yes Yes Charcoal sales
South Sudan 2206 (2015) No Yes Yes
Sudan 1591 (2005) Yes Yes Yes
Taliban 1988 (2011) Yes Yes Yes
Yemen 2140 (2014) Yes Yes Yes





behalf of the UNSC. 
2231 (2015) UNSC authorization 
required
Yes (time limited) Yes (time limited) Nonproliferation; 
financial measures; 
etc.
††May include designations, related material, or related services.
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NOTES
1 United Nations Charter, Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/.
2 Final reports of  the UN Panels on Iran (e.g., S/2014/394 and on DPRK [e.g., S/2014/147]).
3 Final reports of  the UN Panels on Iran (e.g., S/2014/394 and S/2015/401) and on Libya (S/2016/209).
4 “The Compendium of  the High-Level Review of  United Nations Sanctions June 2015,” UN documents A/69-941 and 
S/2015/432.
5 Record of  the 7323rd meeting of  the Security Council 25 November 2014 (UN document S/PV.7323).
6 “Compendium High-Level Review of  United Nations Sanctions November 2015” (http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_
Compendium_2015.pdf).
7 McKirdy, Euan.  CNN.com “Bodies of  2 UN experts found in Democratic Republic of  Congo”  March 29, 2017. Available at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/africa/congo-un-bodies-found/index.html
The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The first barrels of crude 
shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into tankers 
in May 2014. Threats of legal action by Iraq’s central 
government have reportedly held back buyers to take 
delivery of the cargoes so far. The pipeline can currently 
operate at a capacity of 300,000 b/d, but the Kurdish 
government plans to eventually ramp-up its capacity to 1 
million b/d, as Kurdish oil production increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

